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The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on 
Real and Accrual Earnings Management Practices: 
Evidence from Jordan 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on 
real (REM), accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and REM/AEM interaction in Jordan 
following the 2009 Jordanian CG Code (JCGC). 
Design/methodology/approach – The study used a sample of 108 Jordanian public firms 
covering 2010-2014. Hypotheses are tested using pooled OLS-regression models. 
Findings – We find both institutional and managerial ownership constrain the use of REM and 
AEM. In contrast, both independent directors and large shareholders are found to exaggerate 
such practices, and CEO-duality is found to exaggerate REM only. However, foreign ownership 
does not appear to have a significant impact. We further find that managers use REM and AEM 
jointly to obtain the greatest earnings impact. 
 
Practical implications – Our findings have important implications for policymakers, 
regulators, audit professionals and investors in their attempts to constrain earnings management 
(EM) practices and improve financial reporting quality in Jordan. 
Originality/value – We believe this to be the first Jordanian study examining the relationship 
between CG mechanisms and both REM and AEM following the introduction of the 2009 
JCGC, as well as the first in Jordan and the Middle East to examine board characteristics and 
REM. Moreover, it is the first to test for the potential substitution of REM and AEM since the 
2009 JCGC enactment. As such, the findings draw attention to EM practices and the role of 
monitoring mechanisms in Jordan. 
Keywords- Accrual earnings management, board characteristics, corporate governance, 
Jordan, ownership structure, real earnings management. 
Paper type- Research paper. 
  
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Earnings is a critical reported number, and managers understand this to be a key metric 
for outsiders to assess not only the company’s and the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) 
performance (Graham et al., 2005), but also executive compensation and future prospects of 
the firm (Xu et al., 2007). Thus, there are strong incentives to bias financial reports by 
manipulating the reported earnings to attain desired benchmarks. As such, earnings 
manipulation, even when not violating general accounting standards, may lead to inappropriate 
information about the firm (Rahman and Ali, 2006). Such EM has detrimental effects on the 
quality of financial reporting and may be reduced by applying good CG mechanisms (Uadiale, 
2012) to improve the integrity of financial reports and act as a deterrent to manipulation. We 
focus on the monitoring and disciplining role of two critical internal mechanisms, specifically, 
the board of directors and ownership structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014).  
Studies based on US and UK data show good CG can minimise earnings manipulation 
(e.g. Klein, 2002 and Peasnell et al., 2005). Here we investigate whether US and UK findings 
hold for Jordanian firms, extending research by investigating whether CG can assist in 
mitigating REM and AEM and impact substitution between REM and AEM. Differences in 
findings are to be expected as Jordan is a Middle East and North African (MENA) country 
where ownership is highly concentrated and investor protection is considered weak (World 
Bank, 2016). 
CG reforms in Jordan are part of the country’s economic reforms. The cornerstone of 
these reforms is the 2009 JCGC for companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 
This code aims to (i) establish a clear framework regulating the relationships and management 
of ASE listees; (ii) to define rights, duties and responsibilities; and (iii) to safeguard rights of 
all stakeholders (JCGC, 2009). However, as the code is not legally binding, managers may still 
be tempted to manipulate earnings.  
Consistent with prior studies in EM (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kuo et al., 2014; Alhadab et al., 2015, among others) we compute 
REM statistics by using the residuals from the Roychowdhury model (2006) and AEM ones by 
using residuals from the Kothari et al. (2005) model. In summary we have four key findings. 
First, board independence is significantly and positively related to REM and AEM in Jordan. 
Second, consistent with the “Convergence of Interests’ Hypothesis”, institutional ownership 
appears to constrain both REM and AEM; managerial ownership also appears to limit 
manipulation. Third, in line with the “Expropriation-of-the-Minority Shareholders 
Hypothesis", the presence of large shareholders appears to raise the incidence of both REM and 
AEM. Finally, Jordanian firms are found to follow an overall EM strategy, using both REM 
and AEM to obtain the desired earnings impact. 
Our results contribute to the existing literature in EM and CG in five ways. First, this 
study is the first to investigate the impact of CG mechanisms on constraining REM and AEM 
after the introduction of JCGC in 2009. Previous EM research has largely been focused on 
developed countries and developing countries, which the OECD estimates will generate 60% 
of world GDP by 2030 (OECD Development Centre, 2010), have been under researched. 
Second, previous research on CG and EM has focused primarily on AEM (e.g. Klein, 2002; 
Chen and Zhang, 2014; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca, 2014, among others) rather than REM. 
Third, the study examines the impact of foreign share ownership on EM. Fourth, this is the first 
study that classifies Jordanian listed companies according to their one-digit SIC code in order 
to estimate the normal levels of REM and AEM based on an industry-year basis as in the 
original models (Kothari et al., 2005 and Roychowdhury, 2006).  Fifth, the findings of this 
study are useful for policy and regulators who seek to devise CG mechanisms.  
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the previous light 
of the previous literature; section 3 describes our research design; section 4 presents the 
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empirical results; robustness checks are presented in Section 5 and conclusions are presented 
in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Earnings Management and Corporate Governance 
 
EM can be classified into two categories: AEM and REM (for example, 
Roychowdhury, 2006; Lo, 2008; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kuo et al., 
2014; Alhadab et al., 2015). According to Dechow and Skinner (2000, p .240), AEM involves 
accounting choices within Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), that aim to 
‘‘obscure’’ or ‘‘mask’’ true economic performance. These choices include, fair value 
measurement, depreciation, deferred tax, goodwill impairments etc. (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In contrast to this, REM occurs when managers adjust the timing or structuring of transactions, 
investment and allocation of resources to alter accounting earnings within a current period 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Roychowdhury, 2006). Hence, it is the operational practice that is 
“managed” in this case rather than accounting policy. Examples of REM include price 
discounting or offering lenient credit terms to temporarily increase sales; overproducing to 
report lower cost of goods sold; and cutting discretionary expenditures (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). The results of the survey by Graham et al. 
(2005) has drawn the attention of academic researchers to the managerial tendency to use REM 
and shows that it becoming more prevalent since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (e.g. Cohen 
et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Kuo et al., 2014, among others). This 
switch may have occurred  for two possible reasons. Firstly, AEM may not provide sufficient 
oppportunity to bridge the gap to desired earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010). Secondly, managing accruals is more likely to draw the attention of the auditor or 
regulator than real decisions about pricing and production (Graham et al., 2005). 
A vital monitoring system to ensure the quality of the financial reporting process is 
“Corporate Governance”; this phrase is generally taken to refer to a system that aims primarily 
to resolve agency problems and reduce agency costs by aligning managerial interests with the 
interests of shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). According to Cohen, et al (2002, p.587) 
“…one of the most important functions that corporate governance can play is in ensuring the 
quality of the financial reporting process”. 
The board of directors is a key internal CG mechanism for monitoring the quality and 
integrity of financial reports.  Many scholars such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), 
and Fama and Jensen (1983) perceive the board as an effective monitoring mechanism reducing 
agency conflicts between ownership and management. They contend that the board has the 
legal authority to protect shareholder interests by ratifying and monitoring managerial activities 
as well as evaluating and rewarding managers. According to Liu and Fong (2010), the more 
control the board exercises over managers (agents), the less opportunity for them to engage in 
selfish activities not consistent with maximizing shareholder wealth. Ownership structure can 
also be a control; Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014 ,p.420) state ownership structure is “an 
internal control mechanism that focuses on the aspects that define the ownership of the 
company and refers to the manner in which titles or rights of representation redistribute the 
capital of the company in one or more individuals or legal entities”. Wei, 2007, found that 
country differences in CG practices could be explained by different ownership structures.  
Accordingly, EM practices are also expected to differ between countries. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
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Based on agency theory, monitoring strategies such as CG mechanisms, are introduced 
to align the interests of agent and principals, reducing, therefore, managerial opportunity over 
earnings. The following sub-sections briefly review the previous literature results regarding 
each mechanism, set up the research hypotheses and provide the rationale for each hypothesis. 
 
2.2.1 Board Structure Variables 
2.2.1.1 Board Independence 
 
Board independence has been put forward as a strong CG mechanism for monitoring 
and restricting managerial opportunism. According to Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983), including independent directors improves the effectiveness of the board as a control 
mechanism. Independents have incentives to develop reputations as experts in decision making 
and monitoring, having generally gained expertise through acting as managers in other 
companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Thus, independent directors have a strong incentive to act 
as competent monitors (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Drawing upon OECD and UK recommendations (OECD, 2004; and Cadbury, 1992), 
the 2009 JCGC recommends that at least one-third of board members should be independent. 
This approach is supported by findings in most previous literature, both for AEM, for example 
Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996), Klein (2002) , Peasnell et al. (2005), Roodposhti and 
Chashmi (2011), Uadiale (2012) and Chen and Zhang (2014) and for REM, for example Osma 
(2008), Kang and Kim (2012) and Talbi et al. (2015). In a Jordanian context there has been one 
study undertaken by Abed et al. (2012) which researched the role of independent directors in 
deterring AEM before the 2009 JCGC introduction, finding no significant relationship between 
board independence and AEM. Hence, there is no previous research regarding independent 
directors and AEM in Jordan following the introduction of the 2009 JCGC and none at all 
regarding independent directors and REM. Given prior research and the 2009 JCGC 
recommendations, we postulate the following hypotheses; 
 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and REM in Jordan. 
 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors and AEM in Jordan. 
 
2.2.1.2 Board Size 
 
As well as the independence, the size of the board may play an important role in 
enhancing the monitoring efficiency over EM decisions. Agency theory would suggest that 
larger boards are more likely to have the expertise, diversity and time to monitor management 
more effectively (Dalton et al., 1998). Previous AEM empirical results appear to be 
inconclusive with Klein (2002), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Ghosh et al. (2010) finding larger 
boards effective in constraining EM, but others, including Rahman and Ali (2006) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008), concluding the reverse. In the REM literature, Kang and Kim (2012) 
provide evidence that REM decreases as board size increases, whilst Talbi et al. (2015) finds 
the opposite and others (e.g. Osma, 2008) find no association.  The current study is more 
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concerned with the monitoring role of the board, hence, the view that larger boards with more 
independents, have more monitoring capacity leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between board size and REM 
in Jordan. 
 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between board size and AEM 
 in Jordan. 
 
2.2.1.3 CEO-duality 
 
From an agency theory perspective, separating CEO and board chair positions is 
thought to improve monitoring, otherwise one person has excessive power (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen, 1993). An opposing viewpoint is that this “CEO-duality” can lead to an increase 
in the value of the firm because of centralisation and enhanced coordination (for example see 
Davis et al., 1997). Dechow et al. (1996), Klein (e.g. 2002) and Roodposhti and Chashmi 
(2011), among others, link CEO-duality to raised AEM, However, other empirical studies such 
as Beasley (1996), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Rahman and Ali (2006) report no association. 
The REM literature is also inconclusive on CEO-duality.  Ge and Kim (2014) report a 
link between CEO-duality and REM, yet Garven (2015) and others find no relation. Following 
the OECD and UK, the 2009 JCGC has recommended no CEO-duality. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact of CEO-duality on REM in Jordan and 
in the Middle East region overall. Given the balance of research and the JCGC guidelines, we 
postulate: 
 
H3a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive relationship between CEO-duality and 
REM in Jordan. 
 
H3b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive relationship between CEO-duality and 
AEM in Jordan. 
 
2.2.2 Ownership Structure Variables 
2.2.2.1 Managerial Ownership 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) “Convergence of Interests’ Hypothesis”, 
managerial ownership can play a role in reducing conflict between managers and shareholders 
as it encourages managers to act as shareholders.  However, a high level of managerial 
ownership, the “Entrenchment Hypothesis”, provides managers with significant power and 
opportunity for EM (Morck et al., 1988). Previous AEM empirical results appear to be 
inconclusive; both Ali et al. (2008) and Alves (2012) find AEM negatively related to managerial 
ownership, but Teshima and Shuto (2008) find a positive relationship. Lin and Hwang (2010) 
in their meta-analysis, drawing on 48 prior studies, report a positive relationship between stock 
ownership by audit committee members and EM, supporting a more focused variant of the 
entrenchment hypothesis. More recently, Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) show a non-linear 
relation between insiders' ownership and discretionary accruals that imply that managerial 
ownership is a mechanism that may constrain the use of discretionary accruals only when 
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insider ownership is low. Within the more limited REM research, Cohen et al. (2008) reports 
managerial ownership being linked to reduced REM , yet Liu and Tsai (2015) find no effect in 
Taiwan. 
In Jordan, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) find 
managerial ownership increasing AEM. This finding was before the 2009 JCGC and only 
included the industrial sector. Recently, Ramadan (2016) finds that managerial ownership is 
inversely associated with AEM. Given this and other previous research, we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H4a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and REM in Jordan. 
 
H4b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and AEM in Jordan. 
 
2.2.2.2 Institutional Ownership 
 
Sophisticated stockholders such as institutional investors (Chung et al., 2002) may 
constrain managerial opportunistic EM because they have the ability and resources to monitor, 
discipline and influence managerial decisions (Monks and Minow, 2008). According to Jung 
and Kown (2002), the information content of earnings increases significantly with institutional 
holdings. However, for AEM, overall evidence is mixed with  Chung et al. (2002) and Cheng 
et al. (2013) finding a significant negative relationship between AEM and institutional 
investors, but other studies, such as Roodposhti and Chashmi (2011), find a positive 
relationship.No significant relationship is found by Peasnell et al. (2005), Alves (2012) and 
Chen and Zhang (2014). Within REM research, Bushee (1998), Roychowdhury (2006), Zang 
(2012), Liu and Tsai (2015) and others find that institutional investor ownership is correlated 
with reduced EM.  In Jordan, Ramadan (2016) also finds a negative association in industrial 
firms. Given this, the following hypotheses are formulated:  
 
H5a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and REM in Jordan. 
 
H5b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and AEM management in Jordan 
 
2.2.2.3 Foreign Ownership 
 
Foreign investors may have a positive CG effect as they may have more power to 
monitor corporations than local investors (Young et al., 2008). The limited previous literature 
offers two competing views regarding this issue; ‘‘the information asymmetry hypothesis’’ and 
‘‘the knowledge spillover hypothesis’’ (Guo et al., 2015). Guo et al list a number of potential 
positive spillover effects from the presence of foreign investors with the knowledge spillover 
hypothesis suggesting that the superior knowledge of foreign investors can restrain REM. In 
line with this hypothesis, Ben-Nasr et al. (2015) show that the presence of foreign ownership 
is associated with: (i) lower abnormal accruals, (ii) higher earnings quality and (iii) more 
persistent earnings, supporting the notion that foreign investors require higher quality 
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accounting information, However, ‘the information asymmetry hypothesis’’ implies that the 
presence of foreign ownership may motivate managers to take advantage of their greater local 
knowledge and to engage in earnings manipulation to achieve desired financial results as found 
by Aharony et al. (2000) in China. Research of foreign ownership and REM is very limited; 
Guo et al. (2015) show that foreign investors do play an independent role in restraining REM 
activities. 
Jordan is attractive for foreign investors (ILO, 2013) with a relatively open economy. 
Hence, foreign investment in the ASE is one of the highest in the world (OECD, 2006), 
comprising 49% of market capitalisation (ASE Annual Report, 2015). According to Khanna 
and Palepu (2000), as emerging markets become more integrated into the world economy, 
foreign investors exert a valuable monitoring role on corporate management. Hence, we 
postulate:   
 
H6a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between foreign ownership 
and REM in Jordan. 
 
H6b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant negative relationship between foreign ownership 
and AEM in Jordan. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.4 Large shareholder Ownership 
 
Two competing hypotheses exist in the previous literature regarding the role of 
concentrated ownership in the firm; "The Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis" and “The 
Expropriation-of-the-Minority Shareholders Hypothesis". According to ‘‘The Efficient 
Monitoring Hypothesis’’, large shareholders play a significant role in monitoring managers and 
reducing their opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
because they have both an interest in profit maximisation and enough control to have their 
interest respected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In a Latin American context, Gonzalez and 
Garcia-Meca (2014) report that the largest shareholder only constrains AEM when their 
ownership is not extremely high. An alternative theory, “The Expropriation-of-the-Minority 
Shareholders Hypothesis" argues that when ownership structures become more concentrated, 
controlling shareholders may act opportunistically against the interests of minority shareholders 
to increase their private wealth (for example, Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
Limited previous research in Jordan includes Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010),  who find that 
block-holders in industrial companies have no significant impact on constraining AEM. 
However, Ramadan (2016) finds equity concentration reduces EM in industrial firms. These 
conflicting results may be a result of the different time periods. In Jordan, like many Middle 
East and emerging markets, large shareholdings, often families, are common (World Bank, 
2004). Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014) find concentrated ownership structures cause CG 
problems; this may well be the case in Jordan and hence: 
 
H7a: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive relationship between the largest 
shareholder ownership and REM in Jordan. 
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H7b: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant positive relationship between the largest 
shareholder ownership and AEM in Jordan. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample and Data 
 
The sample is Jordanian firms listed on the ASE from 2010 to 2014. Data on REM. 
AEM and CG variables are hand-collected from the annual reports of the sample firms that are 
publicly available on the ASE website. The study covers two sectors, the industrial and the 
service sectors; following previous literature on EM, the financial sector is excluded. The 
exclusion of these institutions results in a potential sample size of 133 firms. Excluding firms 
with missing CG data1, gives a final sample of 108 firms and 540 firm-year observations (see 
Table 1); 53 firms belong to the service sector and 55 to the industrial sector. Although the 
analysis covers the 2010 to 2014 period, 2008 and 2009 corporate data is collected to compute 
REM measures. 
                                ----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
The study uses the one- digit SIC Code classification for six different industries with a 
minimum of five companies in each industry. Additionally, (similar to Zang, 2012 and Alhadab 
et al., 2015), the top and bottom 1 per cent of independent and dependent variables are 
winsorized to eliminate the effect of outlier bias. Given the secretive nature and inadequate 
disclosure of Jordanian reporting along with the absence of any databases that provide financial 
data and governance information, the hand collected data used in this analysis is unique and 
valuable. 
 
3.2 Earnings Management Measurement 
3.2.1 Real Earnings Proxy 
 
Following previous research, we used the Roychowdhury model (2006) to estimate the 
REM proxy. This model focuses primarily on three significant operational activities through 
which managers may manipulate earnings. These activities include; (i) sales manipulation 
through increasing price discounts or offering more lenient credit terms, (ii) reduction in 
discretionary expenditures, such as reducing the research and development (R&D), advertising, 
selling and administrating (SG&A) expenses, and (iii) overproduction to report lower COGS. 
According to Roychowdhury (2006), managers may boost sales by using discounts or lenient 
credit terms in the current period, this is likely to lead to raised production costs, reduced 
margins and a fall-back in sales in the following year. Therefore, we expect an abnormally low 
operating cash flow (ABCFO) in the current period as a result of sales manipulation (Eq. 1). 
Alternatively, to manage earnings upward, firms can overproduce inventory to report a high 
operational margin, hence a higher value of the residual ABPROD, see Eq. (2). Managers can 
also manipulate earnings by reducing discretionary expenditures, so, Eq. (3) tests for lower 
                                                          
1 Missing corporate governance variables are mainly due to the lack of disclosure by some of the sample 
firms. 
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abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISXP). The models are estimated for each year and for 
each industry cluster with at least six companies. 
 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟑
𝜟𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕  (𝟏) 
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟑
𝜟𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟒
𝜟𝑺𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕   (𝟐) 
𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿𝑷𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝑺𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (𝟑) 
Where, CFOit is cash flow from operations of firm i in year t, TAit-1 represents total 
assets at the end of year t - 1, Sit is net sales for firm i in year t, ΔSit is changes in net sales for 
firm i between year t - 1 and year t, and εit is the regression residuals which represent our proxy 
for abnormal cash flow from operations. PRODit is firm i’s production costs in year t, which 
equals the sum of the costs of goods sold plus changes in inventory, and εit is the regression 
residuals which represent our proxy for abnormal production costs. DISXPit is the discretionary 
expenses including selling, general and administrative expenses, R&D, and advertising for firm 
i in year t, and εit is the regression residuals which represent our proxy for abnormal 
discretionary expenditures. In addition, we construct an overall proxy, Eq. (4), by combining 
the aforementioned individual proxies. The aggregate real management proxy is expressed as: 
REM_ALL = -Abnormal cash flow from operations + Abnormal production costs-
Abnormal discretionary expenses (4) 
Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and many others, the larger REM_ALL the 
greater the implied use of REM. 
 
3.2.2 Accrual Earnings Proxy 
 
This study uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for AEM behavior as estimated by 
Dechow et al.’s (1995) cross-sectional version of the Modified Jones model. As suggested by 
Kothari et al. (2005), ROA is added to the model in order to control for extreme operating 
performance as this can bias the discretionary accruals estimation (for example Cohen et al., 
2008; Alhadab et al., 2015). The model is estimated cross-sectionally each year for each 
industry. Discretionary accruals are the residuals of this accrual expectation model.  
𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟐 
𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕 − 𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟑
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟒 𝑹𝑶𝑨(𝒊𝒕 𝒐𝒓 𝒊𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (𝟓) 
 
Where, TACC it is the total accruals, TA it -1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at 
the end of year t -1, ΔREVit - ΔRECit is sales revenues of firm i in year t less revenues in year t 
– 1, Δ REC is the change in accounts receivables. PPE it / TA it -1 is gross property, plant and 
equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by TA it -1, ROAit is the return on assets, which is 
earnings before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets, α β1 β2 β3 β4 are estimated 
parameters, and ε is the residual that represents our proxy for discretionary accruals.  
The main objective of our study is to measure the impact of CG mechanisms on REM 
and AEM in Jordan after the 2009 JCGC introduction. Hence, the absolute values of the 
residuals from Roychowdhury’s model (2006) and Kothari et al. (2005) are used in the 
multivariate analyses in our study. 
 
10 
 
3.3. Regression Models 
 
Following previous REM and AEM literature  (e.g. Osma, 2008; Gonzalez and Garcia-
Meca, 2014; Chen and Zhang, 2014 among others), the present study uses the following model 
to investigate whether board characteristics and ownership structure are able to constrain REM 
and AEM in the Jordanian context. 
EMit = α0+ β1 BINDit + β2 BSIZEit + β3 CEODUALit + β4 MANGOWit + β5 
INSTOWit + β6FOREOWit + β7 LARGSTit+ β8FSIZEit + β9 LEVit + β10ROAit + β11 MKTBit + 
β12 BIG4it + β13-17INDDUMit+ β18-21 YEARDUMit+ ε it (6) 
The dependent variable, EM, is either the real or accrual earnings proxy. When it is the 
real proxy; it will be tested as each of the three individual real earnings proxies and as the 
aggregate proxy. When EM is the accrual proxy; it is the abnormal discretionary accruals 
(ABDACC). The independent variables are detailed in Appendix 1 as are the firm characteristic 
variables that might affect the level of EM and the five controls that potentially affect earnings 
levels and quality. Thus, without any prediction of the coefficient’s signs, these variables are 
incorporated into this study to distinguish their effects on REM and AEM. Finally, the models 
also control for industry and year fixed effects. 
We further test for the potential substitution between REM and AEM. Following Ge 
and Kim (2014), Doukakis (2014), and others, the abnormal discretionary accruals proxy is 
added as an independent variable to the main model of our study. A negative (positive) 
coefficient on AEM would be interpreted as evidence of a substitutive (complementary) relation 
between REM and AEM in the Jordanian context. Further, there have been some minor 
necessary changes to the control variables for this model: 
REMit = α0+ β1AEMit+ β2BINDit + β3BSIZEit + β4CEODUALit + β5MANGOWit + 
β6INSTOWit + β7FOREOWit + β8LARGSTit+ β9FSIZEit + β10NOAit-1 + β11MKTSHit + 
β12BIG4it + β13-17INDDUMit+ β18-21YEARDUMit+ ε it (7) 
Where, the model is run with REM as the aggregate measure (REM_ALL), and also as 
the two sub-aggregate measures (REM1 and REM2)2, defined in Appendix 1. The augmented 
control variables are also in Appendix 1. 
 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 is divided into two panels; Panel A reports the regression coefficients used to 
estimate ‘normal’ level of proxies; it shows the mean coefficients and t-statistics from standard 
errors across industry-years. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables 
used in the analysis classified by group. As can be seen from Panel A, the estimated regression 
coefficients for EM proxies are consistent with prior studies (for example, Roychowdhury, 
2006 and Kang and Kim, 2012). The average adjusted R2s across industry-years show 
reasonable explanatory power and are consistent with those produced by Roychowdhury (2006) 
and Zang (2012). Similar to previous studies, such as Zang (2012), Kang and Kim (2012), Goh 
et al. (2013) and Kuo et al. (2014), the means of EM proxies in this study are almost zero, 
implying that the models fit the data fairly well, consistent with Hayes (2009, p.282). The 
abnormal cash flow from operations in Jordan ranges from -0.047 to 0.046 which is rather lower 
                                                          
2 Following previous literature such as Kuo et al. (2014), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), the present study divides the 
aggregate measure of REM into two sub-aggregate measures to avoid any double counting problems.   
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than the US range of Ge and Kim (2014a), though comparable to the Korean findings of Goh 
et al. (2013).  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
The medians and ranges of EM variables - ABPROD, ABDISXP, REM_ALL, REM1, REM2 
ABDACC – are largely in line with previous studies (for example Kuo et al., 2014; Ghosh et 
al., 2010). For Board variables, Panel B shows that the mean (median) BIND is 0.34 (0.28), 
suggesting that just less than half of Jordanian firms are broadly in line with ASE 
recommendations of at least one third independent board members. The mean (median) of 
BSIZE is 8.09 (8) whilst the mean (median) of CEO duality (CEODUAL) is 0.17 (0), which 
means that about 83% of Jordanian firms follow the ASE recommendations. For ownership 
structure variables, Panel B shows that the mean (median) of managerial ownership is 0.50 
(52%) which is a very high relative to other emerging countries, such as 19.7% in Saudi Arabia 
(Alghamdi, 2012) and  9.9 % in Malaysia (Ali et al., 2008). Institutional ownership shows a 
mean (median) of 39% (37%). Foreign ownership in Jordanian industrial and service firms has 
a mean (median) of 17% (0.07), rather lower than the whole market proportion due to high 
foreign ownership in the excluded finance sector. Finally, largest shareholder ownership has a 
mean of 36%, confirming high concentration in Jordan compared to developed markets.  
Panel B also shows a higher total debt to total assets ratio for Jordanian firms those in developed 
countries (see Zalata and Roberts, 2015). As with Kang and Kim’s (2012) Korean sample, there 
is a low return (ROA), though the market to book ratio is higher than that reported for Korea 
by Goh et al. (2013). Only 37% of Jordanian firms have BIG4 auditors. The small market share 
numbers are due in part to the need to define industry broadly, using just the first digit of the 
standard industry code, in order to achieve a useable number of observations within each 
industry classification. 
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlations between CG variables and other firm-specific 
variables. The table reveals that the proxies for the hypotheses are not highly correlated with 
one another or with the control variables, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
---------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
4.2.1 Corporate Governance, Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
 
Table 4 reports the regression results of the models. Columns (1–5) report the results 
where each of the REM and AEM proxies (ABCFO, ABPROD, ABDISXP, REM_All, and 
ABDACC) serve as the dependent variable, respectively. The results of the multivariate 
regression analyses are reported in p values based on Newey and West standard errors, 
correcting for the impact of both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. The data do 
not suffer from multicollinearity problems as the highest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.53.  
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----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
As can be seen from the table, board independence has a positive and significant 
coefficient at the 1 or 5% level in all model variants, implying that independent boards in Jordan 
are more likely to engage both REM and AEM. This finding is consistent with Sun and Liu 
(2016). According to Ge and Kim (2014), this positive relation can be a result of the market 
pressure exerted from tough board performance monitoring from independent board members 
which may lead to a decrease in managerial commitment to long-term goals and a push to REM 
for short-term targets. Osma (2008) finds UK managers might hide relevant information from 
the board, compromising independent directors’ decision. This might be the case in Jordan too. 
Also, independent directors in Jordan may also be insufficiently independent; Al-Jazi (2007) 
finds nepotism is common in appointments due to the influence of block-holders and 
independent directors may be compromised by private relationships. The market for 
independent directors in Jordan may also be immature. Whilst they might lack the accounting 
sophistication needed to detect REM, when it comes to discretionary expenditures, independent 
directors appear to exert some control. 
When using ABDISXP as a proxy for REM, the board size shows a significant and 
positive relationship, indicating that larger boards are more likely to reduce discretionary 
expenditures in order to increase current earnings. This might be due to family dominance on 
boards and appointments based on kinship or friendship. This result is also supported by 
previous REM studies, for example Talbi et al. (2015) and Kang and Kim (2012). Further, in 
line with Ge and Kim (2014), REM through over-production is more prevalent with CEO-
duality. 
Consistent with the “Convergence of Interests’ Hypothesis”, managerial ownership is 
found, to some extent, to be useful in mitigating REM through sales manipulation and  
discretionary accruals. The ABDACC result is also significant and  confirms the results of 
others, including Ali et al. (2008) and Klein (2002). Institutional investor ownership reduces 
REM through sales manipulation and through discretionary expenditures; this finding is 
consistent with previous REM studies, including Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) and 
the ABDACC finding is also consistent with other AEM studies. This implies that sophisticated 
institutional investors in Jordan have a greater ability to analyze the long-term implications of 
current managerial actions and act as a disincentive for managers to engage in EM. Foreign 
ownership (FOREOW) is insignificant in all models. Dvorak (2005) suggests distance educes 
ineffectiveness.  
LARGST is significant and positive, as expected, which means block-holders push 
managers to engage in EM through sales manipulation and through AEM. As mentioned before 
the high degree of ownership concentration is usually in the form of family-controlled 
businesses (ROSC, 2004).  Further, controlling shareholders have incentives to maximize  the 
earnings with the intent of increasing the share price to obtain more benefits from minority 
shareholders through inflating the share price (Chen and Zhang, 2014). 
FSIZE is significant and negative, indicating that larger firms in Jordan are less likely 
to manage earnings through sales manipulations and discretionary accruals. This result is 
supported by Ali et al. (2008), Goh et al. (2013), and Ge and Kim (2014).  Consistent with Jiang 
et al. (2008), who highlight that leverage changes may have various effects on EM, leverage in 
our study is found to be significant and  positively linked to ABCFO and ABDACC, perhaps 
indicating that high leverage may lead to EM to avoid debt covenant violation. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of other papers including Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Chen and 
Zhang (2014). Similarly, ROA is found to be significant and positively impacting REM, 
indicating that better performing firms in Jordan are more likely to engage in REM through 
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sales manipulation. We also find that firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to 
engage in REM.  Finally, consistent with the results of Doukakis (2014) and Zang (2012), 
having a BIG4 audit has no impact in mitigating REM nor AEM in Jordan.  
 
4.2.2 Potential Substitution between Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
 
To test for substitution, following Ge and Kim (2014), Doukakis (2014), and others, 
the abnormal discretionary accruals proxy is incorporated as an independent variable in the 
main REM model; a positive (negative) coefficient on AEM would be interpreted as evidence 
of a complementary (substitutive) relation between REM and AEM. The aggregate measure 
(REM_ALL) is used as a dependent variable. Further, two sub-aggregate measures REM1 and 
REM2 are used, because aggregating the three REM measures together into one measure may 
result in a double discounting problem. Table 5 reports the results of multivariate regression 
analysis for this model. All reported p values are based on Newey and West procedures. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 ---------------------------------------------- 
There is a strong positive relationship between REM and AEM in all models (t-statistic 
4.97, 6.61, and 8.79, respectively), indicating that Jordanian firms use both REM and AEM as 
complements to each other with a combined EM strategy. This finding is similar to that reported 
in Taiwan by Chen et al. (2012), attributing this to the country’s weak investor protection.  BIG4 
remains insignificant, implying managers do not need to switch to AEM to REM in order to 
avoid audit scrutiny. All other variables exhibit the same directional relationships as before, 
providing support for the results from the previous analysis. 
5. Robustness Checks 
5.1 Composite Measure of Board and Ownership Variables 
 
Following Sun and Cahan (2009), we aggregate the individual governance quality 
scores as this is more likely to give a richer presentation of board and ownership structure 
quality. Jiang (2008) and Zalata and Roberts (2015) have generated composite measures of 
board and audit committee governance quality and examined the relationship between the 
governance score and financial reporting quality. Accordingly, we compute a composite 
measure of governance quality. The direction of the relationship between individual measures 
of CG and board and ownership structure governance quality is not always clear i.e. large sized 
boards might enhance the monitoring effectiveness or might harm it. Thus, following Sun and 
Cahan (2009) and Zalata and Roberts (2015), we used the sign of each individual measure under 
the main analysis in order to establish the governance quality direction. The composite measure 
is the sum of each individual variable score where the higher sum reflects an effective board 
and ownership structure.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
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As can be seen from Table 6, there is a strong evidence of the ability of CG to determine 
the overall level of REM. In particular, the composite measure of CG (GOVSCOR) appears to 
have a significant negative relationship with REM manipulations through sales manipulations 
and overproduction (t-statistic= -3.35, and -1.77, respectively). However, there is a significant 
and positive relationship between GOVSCOR and ABDISXP, indicating that tightening CG 
mechanisms appears to increase REM by decreasing the discretionary expenses. According to 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) and others, firms tend to manipulate their business activities to 
manage earnings when tighter accounting standards and/or regulation reduces their ability to 
manage accruals. As expected, the table also shows that there is a significant negative 
relationship between GOVSCOR and ABDACC, indicating that a strong CG structure can 
effectively decrease EM through AEM.  The results for control variables are similar to that 
reported in the main analysis. When comparing these results with the results under the main 
analysis, it can be concluded that the significance level for the composite measure is higher 
than the level for each variable separately, suggesting that the board and ownership structure 
combine as a system. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The present paper has investigated the impact of CG mechanisms on both REM and 
AEM, and their potential interaction. Three types of REM and the abnormal discretionary 
accrual for AEM are considered. For internal CG mechanisms, board characteristics are 
examined along with ownership structure. Using panel data from Jordanian public firms over 
the 2010-2014 period, the empirical results reveal that CG does influence companies’ decisions 
to manipulate reported earnings. Both institutional ownership and managerial ownership are 
found to constrain REM and AEM. In contrast, independent directors and having a large 
shareholder are found to exaggerate the incidence of using both REM and AEM, while CEO-
duality is found to exaggerate REM only. Foreign ownership does not appear to have any 
significant impact. We find that REM and AEM are used in a complimentary manner to obtain 
desired earnings impact. 
Our results provide government and regulators with important information, linking CG 
to reporting quality. In this study, in contrast to the recommendations of the 2009 JCGC and 
conventional wisdom, the results show that independent directors exacerbate rather than reduce 
the prevalence of opportunism. Thus, policymakers must consider the characteristics of the 
institutional environment before applying further CG reforms. Perhaps the proportion of 
independent directors is too low to influence the board, their experience inadequate or 
independence questionable. These conclusions from Jordan may well apply to other developing 
countries. In addition, the results of our study show that the presence of a large shareholder 
exacerbates REM and AEM. This in turn raises the need for strengthening the rights of minority 
shareholders. CEO-duality is seen to impair board independence and increase REM, justifying 
the 2009 JCGC recommendation. The reported ineffective role of BIG 4 audit firms in 
mitigating earnings manipulation is concerning.  
Notwithstanding the steps taken to ensure the robustness of the results of the current 
paper, some potential limitations remain. For example; separating the consequences of 
opportunistic REM from those of optimal business activities is difficult. Future research that 
allows researchers to separate optimal business actions from managerial opportunism 
associated with REM and AEM is needed. Further, in the present study CG variables are treated 
as exogenously determined. However, there is a possibility that EM and some of those variables 
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are endogenously determined (Denis, 2001). Future research investigating this issue further 
would be worthwhile.  
Our study adds to accounting literature considering the characteristics of the board and 
of ownership structure, extending this line of research on EM and CG mechanisms to a 
developing country, Jordan. Further Jordanian CG research should include a study of the impact 
of the introduction of the 2009 code and whether this led to a step-change in the importance 
and impact of these CG indicators. In examining Jordan and, of course, recognising limitations 
in applying these results to other countries, this study highlights the need for further research 
undertaking similar investigations into other emerging markets in order that the literature 
develops understanding and provides policy guidance for the majority of the world that is 
deemed “developing”. The issues of data limitation in quality, variety and quantity need to be 
faced rather than avoided by a continuing focus on data-rich developed markets. 
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Appendix 1. Variables Definition 
Variables  Definition 
Earnings Management Variables  
ABCFO Abnormal cash flows from operations, measured as deviations from the 
predicted values from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
ABPROD Abnormal production costs, measured as deviations from the predicted values 
from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
ABDISXP Abnormal discretionary expenses, measured as deviations from the predicted 
values from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
REM_ALL Aggregate REM proxy, the sum of the additive inverse of abnormal cash 
flows from operations, the additive inverse of abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal production costs. 
REM1 Aggregate REM proxy 1, the sum of abnormal production costs and additive 
inverse of abnormal cash flows from operations. 
REM2 Aggregate REM proxy 2, the sum of the additive inverse of abnormal cash 
flows from operations and the additive inverse of abnormal discretionary 
expenses. 
 Abnormal discretionary accruals, measured as deviations from the predicted 
values from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
ABDACC Abnormal discretionary accruals, measured as deviations from the predicted 
values from the corresponding industry-year regression. 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BSIZE Board size, equal to a total number of directors on the board.  
BIND Board independence, equal to the proportion of independent directors on the 
board to the total number of directors on the board. 
CEODUAL CEO-duality, is a dummy variable equals 1 if CEO and the chairman positons 
are held by the same person, 0 otherwise. 
MANGOW Managerial ownership, equal to the proportion of shares owned by board 
members and their relatives to the total number of shares outstanding. 
INSTOW  Institutional ownership, equal to the proportion of common shares held by the 
institutions. 
FOREOW Foreign ownership, equal to the proportion of common shares held by the 
foreign investors (non-Jordanian). 
LARGST Largest shareholder, equal to the proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholder who does not serve as an executive officer or director.  
Control Variables 
ROA Return on assets, measured as net income divided by total assets. 
FSIZE Firm size, equal to the natural log of total assets. 
MKTB Market to book ratio. 
LEV Leverage, measured as total liabilities scaled by total assets. 
BIG4 Dummy variable set one if the firm is audited by the big 4-audit firm, zero 
otherwise. 
Additional Variables Used to Test for Potential Substitution between REM and AEM  
MKTSH Market share, measured as the percentage of a company’s sales to the total 
sales of its industry. 
NOAt-1 Net Operating Assets, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the net operating 
assets (i.e., shareholders’ equity less cash and marketable securities plus total 
debt) at the beginning of the year divided by lagged sales are above the 
median of the corresponding industry-year, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection Procedure 
Description 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Pooled 
Initial sample 251 251 251 251 251 1255 
Excluded:  
Financial sector companies (108) (108) (108) (108) (108) (540) 
Missing annual reports and 
/or corporate governance 
data 
(35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (175) 
Final sample 108 108 108 108 108 540 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Model parameters 
 CFOt/At-1 PRODt/At-1 DISXPt/At-1 ABDACC/ At-1 
Intercept 0.0503* 
(1.668) 
-0.0139 
(-0.702) 
0.0280 
(3.687)*** 
-0.0495* 
(-1.711) 
1/At-1 -268789.2** 
(-2.423) 
-31709.5 
(-3.140)*** 
144019.3 
(5.391)*** 
109235.6 
(0.964) 
St/At-1 0.0472 
(0.784) 
0.7674 
(13.183)*** 
- - 
St-1/At-1 - - 0.0737 
(3.627)*** 
- 
∆St/At-1 -0.1137* 
(-1.627) 
0.0415 
(0.321) 
- - 
∆St-1/At-1  -0.0414 
(-0.333) 
- - 
(ΔREV it - ΔREC it)/A it-1) - - - -0.0069 
(-0.124) 
(PPE it /A it-1) - - - 0.0422 
(0.493) 
ROA - - - 0.5935 
 (4.455)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.879 0.254 0.574 
***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. This table reports the 
estimated parameters in the following regressions: 
 
(a) 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟑
𝜟𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
(b) 
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟑
𝜟𝑺𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟒
𝜟𝑺𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
(c) 
𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑿𝑷𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝑺𝒊𝒕−𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕  
 
(d)
𝑻𝑨𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒕 
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 
𝟏
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟐 
𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑽𝒊𝒕− 𝜟𝑹𝑬𝑪𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+ 𝜷𝟑
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝑨 𝒊𝒕 −𝟏
+  𝜷𝟒 𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
 
The regressions are estimated for every industry every year. One-digit SIC codes are used to define industries. There are 30 separate 
industry-years over 2010–2014. The table reports the mean coefficient across all industry-years and t-statistics calculated using the 
standard error of the mean across industry-years. The table also reports the mean R2s (across industry-years) for each of these 
regressions. 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for the Full sample 
 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in the regression models used to test the hypotheses. For 
the purposes of illustration, variables representing abnormal operational cash flow and abnormal discretionary 
expenses are multiplied by −1. Accordingly, high values for the proxies for abnormal cash flow (ABCFO) and 
abnormal discretionary expenses (ABDISXP) indicate greater degrees of REM. The sample consists of 540 firm-
years observation during the period 2010-2014.
                                                          
3 Similar to other studies including Zang (2012) and Ge and Kim (2014), to present the range of data, the current 
study does not focus on the Max and Minimum value as this will lead to a range that is not representative of the 
variability within the data because it depends on two most extreme values within data.   
Variables Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
25%3 75% Skewness Kurtosis 
Corporate Governance: Real and ferent Earnings Management Variables   
 Earnings Management Variables   
ABCFO  -0.0000 -0.0024 0.0774 -0.0474 0.0462 -0.1261 4.3230 
ABPROD  -0.0000 0.0065 0.0913 -0.0396 0.0553 -0.5873 4.7871 
ABDISXP 0.0000 0.0130 0.0577 -0.0177 0.0330 -1.1400 4.3122 
REM_ALL 0.0000 0.0154 0.1696 -0.0812 0.1044 -0.6664 4.0760 
REM1 0.0000 0.0064 0.1362 -0.0701 0.0782 -0.4141 4.1419 
REM2 -0.0000 0.0070 0.1004 -0.0512 0.0627 -0.3996 3.4647 
ABDACC -0.0000 0.0000 0.0645 -0.0347 0.0334 0.0559 4.3197 
Corporate Governance Variables   
BIND 0.3425 0.2860 0.2579 0.1820 0.4620 0.6251 2.6684 
BSIZE 8.0925 8.0000 2.1799 7.0000 9.0000 0.4202 2.6465 
CEODUAL 0.1703 0.0000 0.3763 0.0000 0.0000 1.7535 4.0749 
MANGOW 0.5068 0.5215 0.2762 0.2793 0.7307  -0.1220 1.9458 
INSTOW  0.3945 0.3775 0.2906 0.1543 0.6180 0.2412 1.9033 
FOREOW 0.1720 0.0793 0.2235 0.0140 0.2120 1.7301 5.3361 
LARGST 0.3618 0.3080 0.2207 0.1843 0.4900 1.0025 3.3774 
Control Variables   
FSIZE 16.9198 16.9435 1.3386 15.9922 17.7538 0.3395 3.0991 
LEV 0.3380 0.3001 0.2277 0.1660 0.4492 0.8356 3.1195 
ROA 0.0054 0.0158 0.0841 -0.0274 0.0502 -0.7618 3.8948 
MKTB 1.3156 0.9900 0.9200 0.6800 1.6700 1.4227 4.5082 
BIG4 0.3777 0.0000 0.4852 0.0000 1.0000 0.5041 1.2542 
Potential Substitution between REM and AEM Variables   
MKTSH 0.0441 0.0106 0.0850 0.0019 0.0419 3.0290 12.0160 
NOA 0.4685 0.0000 0.4994 0.0000 1.0000 0.1261 1.0159 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
Variables  BIND BSIZE CEODUL MANGOW INSTOW FOREOW LARGST FSIZE LEV ROA MKTB BIG4 
BIND 1            
BSIZE -0.732* 1           
CEODUL -0.0105 0.0169 1          
MANGOW -0.0187 0.0623 -0.0346 1         
INSTOW 0.2047*** 0.0758* -0.2022*** 0.1910*** 1        
FOREOW 0.2091*** -0.0131 0.0652 0.0690 0.3958*** 1       
LARGST 0.1084* -0.1681*** -0.1602*** 0.2280*** 0.4549*** 0.0499 1      
FSIZE -0.0124 0.2980*** -0.0763 -0.0230 0.2191*** 0.2626*** 0.1272*** 1     
LEV -0.0185 -0.0220 -0.1025** -0.1397*** 0.0953** 0.0840* 0.0903** 0.3675*** 1    
ROA -0.0941** 0.0954** 0.1336*** 0.1512*** 0.0315 -0.0489 0.0471 0.3016*** -0.2626*** 1   
MKTB -0.0229 0.0995** 0.0542 0.0621 0.0757* -0.1455*** 0.1228*** 0.0459 0.1808*** 0.0646 1  
BIG4  0.1214*** 0.2019*** -0.1804*** 0.1238*** 0.4095*** 0.3515** 0.0222 0.3400*** 0.1153*** -0.0110 0.0970** 1 
This table presents the Pearson correlations for the independent variables used in the multivariate regression. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant, ***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels. See ‘‘Appendix 1’’ for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: Regression Results 
Variable Exp. 
sign 
(1) 
ABCFO 
(2) 
ABPROD 
(3) 
ABDISXP 
(4) 
REM_ALL 
(5) 
ABDACC 
BIND - 2.35** 2.32** -1.88* 2.92*** 2.39** 
BSIZE - -1.29 -1.31 4.53*** -0.76 -0.55 
CEODUAL + 0.033 1.98* 0.97 2.04** -0.93 
MANGOW - -1.78* -1.06 0.66 -1.53 -2.67*** 
INSTOW  - -2.17** 0.01 -2.38** -2.58*** -2.02** 
FOREOW - -0.12 0.46 -0.21 0.72 -0.65 
LARGST + 3.71*** 1.28 -0.04 2.17** 2.97*** 
FSIZE ? -2.13** 1.14 1.37 1.40 -1.65* 
LEV ? 2.74*** 0.41 -1.02 0.73 3.25*** 
ROA ? 1.94* 2.76*** 1.04 1.65* 1.02 
MKTB ? 0.97 1.94* 2.30** 2.41** -0.61 
BIG4 ? 1.46 0.26 1.15 0.90 0.56 
INDDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
YEARDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
Adj. R-squared  9.14% 23.47% 27.01% 12.84% 25.38% 
F test  F(21, 518)      
=      3.58 
F(21, 518)        
=      69.39 
F(21, 518)        
=      21.75 
F(21, 518)        
=      37.85 
F(21, 518)        =      
67.73 
       
***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. See 
‘‘Appendix 1’’ for variable definitions. 
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Table 5: Results of Multivariate Regression to Test for the Potential Substitution 
  REM_ALL REM1 REM2 
Variables Exp. 
sign 
Coefficients t. Statistic Coefficients t. Statistic Coefficients t. Statistic 
AEM - 0.341 4.97*** 0.415 6.61*** 0.470 8.79 ***   
BIND - 0.061 2.40** 0.074 3.13*** 0.035 1.85* 
BSIZE - -0.002 -0.84 -0.006 -2.31** -0.001 -0.90 
CEODUAL + 0.042 2.40** 0.033 1.99** 0.034 2.51** 
MANGOW - -0.014 -0.61 -0.014 -0.66 0.008 0.47 
INSTOW  - -0.059 -1.97** -0.032 -1.13 -0.065 -2.78*** 
FOREOW - 0.019 0.57 0.008 0.27 0.003 0.12 
LARGST + 0.042 1.25 0.039 1.16 0.018 0.68 
FSIZE - 0.009 1.48 0.005 1.01 -0.002 0.62 
MKTB + 0.018 2.57** 0.012 1.87* 0.014 2.67*** 
MKTSH + 0.171 1.91* 0.105 1.08 0.192 2.71*** 
NOA + -0.008 -0.67 -0.001 -0.14 0.005   0.55 
BIG4 - 0.009 0.63 0.010 -0.77 0.018   1.56 
INDDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
YEARDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
_Cons  0.0893652 .87 0.1310107 1.39 0.1835484 2.35** 
Adj R-
squared 
 17.13% 17.94% 22.66% 
***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. See 
‘‘Appendix 1’’ for variable definitions.  
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Table 6: Governance Composite Score, Robustness Checks 
Variable Exp. 
sign 
(1) 
ABCFO 
(2) 
ABPROD 
(3) 
ABDISXP 
(4) 
REM_ALL 
(5) 
ABDACC 
  t. Statistic t. Statistic t. Statistic t. Statistic t. Statistic 
GOVSCOR - -3.35*** -1.77* 4.35*** -2.59*** -4.80*** 
FSIZE - -2.35** 1.34 2.09** 1.87* -0.54 
LEV + 2.67*** 0.23 -1.24 0.10 2.89*** 
ROA + 2.17** 3.00*** 0.77 1.78* 0.69 
MKTB + 1.69* 2.41** 2.29** 2.98*** -0.21 
BIG4 + 0.46 0.31 -0.14 -0.15 0.06 
INDDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
YEARDUM +/- Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. Inc. 
Adj. R-squared  7.13% 22.12% 25.26% 10.18% 25.69% 
***, **, * Indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels in a two-tailed test, respectively. 
GOVSCOR is the governance composite score. See ‘‘Appendix 1’’ for variable definitions.  
 
 
 
